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Plato's Sophist is complex. Its themes are many and ambiguous. The
early grammarians gave it the subtitle1tEp1. 'tau ov'to~ ('on being') and
assigned it to Plato's logical investigations. The Neoplatonists prized
it for a theory of ontological categories they preferred to Aristotle's.
Modern scholars sometimes court paradox and refer to the Sophist as
Plato's dialogue on not-being (because the question of the possibility
of not-being occupies much of the dialogue). Whitehead took the
Sophist to be primarily about ouvo.~t~ ('power') and found in it many
of the central ideas of process theology.2 Heidegger thought it
articulated the 'average concept of being in general'.3 In Cornford's
view the Sophist is mainly about truth and falsehood. Ackrill, Frede
and most analytic philosophers think it is about predication.4 Stanley
Rosen treats it as a metaphysico-aesthetic dialogue: in his view it is
about the relation of images to originals.5 As far as the title of the
dialogue goes, however, opinion is almost universal. Do not be misled:
'the definition of the sophist' observed Archer-Hind 'is simply a
piece of pungent satire'6 and he added that 'we may be sure that
(Plato] cared little about defining the sophist, but very much about the
metaphysical questions to which the process of definition was to give
rise'.7 The most spectacular case of agreement with this judgment
can be found in Cornford, who omits to translate the sections on the
definition of the sophist because, as he says 'the modern reader ...
might be wearied'.8
Opinion is nearly unanimous on another point as well. Although
Plato wrote all of his philosophy in dramatic form, there is really
nothing important about the drama of the Sophist. 'The dialogues
cease to be conversations' in Plato's later period.9 The 'main speaker'
of the dialogue, the Eleatic ~€vo~ (the word means both 'guest' and
'stranger') simply speaks for Plato. Where Socrates had been 'Plato's
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mouthpiece' in the early dialogues, the Stranger, as he is customarily
called, now has that role. Never mind that Socrates appears in the
Sophist as well.
I confess that I would not recommend the Sophist to anyone as
a work of literature. But I deny that the dramatic form is ever
unimportant in Plato. In my own work on Plato I have found that the
drama and the philosophy are not separable. to At the very least, the
drama complements, supplements, and augments the philosophy. Let
me cite what should be an uncontroversial example from the Sophist.
Theodorus innocently uses the word '(EVCX; ('kind') in his first speech:
the Stranger, he says, belongs to the '(Evoe., of Elea (Le. he is E1eatic
by birth). Socrates, who has a nose for ambiguity, picks up the term
in his second speech, claiming that the kind called 'philosopher' is
scarcely easier to discern than the kind 'god'. The discussion then
turns to a consideration of three '(EVTJ ('kinds')-sophist, statesman
and philosopher [216c3, 217a7]-but ultimately even this topic yields
to discussion of the five JlEyto't(l ,(EVTJ ('greatest kinds'), namely
being, sameness, difference, motion and rest. An innocent remark
leads to the most extraordinary inquiry. This progression is the
dramatic complement of the Stranger's own remark that: 'one must
practise first on small and easy things before progressing to the very
greatest' [218dl-2].
I worry that the connection runs deeper; that the drama may on
occasion qualify and reshape the philosophy. As Chaucer observed,
following a principle explicitly .stated in the Laches, "Eek Plato
seith, whoso can hym rede, the wordes moote be cosyn to the dede' .11
From this point of view the drama is fundamental, the philosophy
complementary. I do not want to accept that. AU the same, a
consideration of the dramatic context of the Sophist invites the view
that it is so. In particular, it invites us to deny that the Eleatic Stranger
is Plato~s mouthpiece and it invites us to consider that the theme of
sophistry is the important theme of the dialogue.
My reason for saying this is that the dialogue appears to be an
image of the creature it is named for. Rene Magritte said, 'An object
encounters its image, an object encounters its name. It can happen
that the object's name and its image encounter each other'.12 In the
drama of the Sophist the encounter of image and name comes first.
The Stranger says to Theaetetus (218c): 'as of now you and I have
only a name in common about him [viz. the sophist] but we might
perhaps have by ourselves in private the work for which we severally
call him',13 The image of the sophist and the name 'Sophist' then
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encounter each other in 1tOUCl.Ata. ('complexity', Sophist 223c), for
they are mated to each other in six different definitions. But where
in all this is the complex object, the sophist himself? Consider
this: the Eleatic Stranger's image of the sophist is, as he says, a AOy<X;
1ta.JlJl1J1CTJ<;, (217e4) an 'altogether long speech.' Yet he insists later
[236a-b] that all those who paint or otherwise fashion large works
dismiss what is true and produce images that merely look right from
a point of view that is not right. The sophist, he says, is a maker of
such images in speech. If we were to view the Stranger's speech ElC
lCa.AoU (236b4) 'from [a] beautiful [vantage point]' what would we
see? Would we see a distorted image of not-being?
The view that the Eleatic Stranger is the object: sophist, is a
dreadful hypothesis, but the drama of the dialogue may warrant it. To
persuade you to take it seriously, if only for the purpose of refuting
it, I ask you to examine the drama of the dialogue's flrst pages. Look
at the speeches not as so much banter, but as coming from speciflc
persons, acquainted with and disposed toward one another in speciflc
ways, meeting on speciflc terms, and so on. Then see whether it is
possible any longer to say that the Eleatic Stranger is simply the
philosopher Plato in disguise.
Let me begin by reminding you that as a dramatic work the Sophist
does not stand alone; it is part of the tetralogy: Theaetetus, Sophist,
Statesman, Philosopher. The flrst three of these dialogues we have,
the fourth one Plato never wrote. The characters of the dialogues
are: Socrates, Theodorus (an eminent mathematician from Cyrene),
Theaetetus and his friend, a young Socrates (both students of
Theodorus), and the Eleatic Stranger, who does not appear in the
Theaetetus. 14 At the end of the Theaetetus Socrates arranges a meeting
on the next day, upon which the Sophist begins. The Statesman is
temporally continuous with the Sophist. The point of all this is that
we cannot make sense of the drama of the Sophist apart from these
other dialogues. We must think who Socrates and Theodorus are, for
example, and how they are, if the opening conversation of the Sophist
is to make any sense. With that in mind let us tum to the dialogues.
The flrst several speeches of the Sophist come from Socrates and
Theodorus. Theodorus' flrst words point back to their conversation
of the previous day: 'According to yesterday's agreement', he says.
Going back to the previous day we note that the relationship between
Socrates and Theodorus is antagonistic. In the Theaetetus Socrates
met Theodorus with rudeness: 'If I cared more for those in Cyrene'
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he begins, 'I would be asking you about the young people there ...
but as it is, I like them less' [Theaetetus 143d]. Socrates wants to
know only whether any Athenian boys might prove virtuous.
Theodorus returns the discourtesy: 'As a matter of fact, Socrates,
I can tell you about an Athenian boy who meets this description.
And if he were beautiful, I'd be afraid to speak of him in such strong
terms, lest anyone think I'm in love with him, but as it is (he echoes
Socrates) ... he resembles you.' On other occasions, 1beodorus appears
not just discourteous, but vengeful. When, at the beginning of the
Statesman, Socrates catches him making a mistake in calculation,
Theodorus says 'I'll get you for it later' .
In the Statesman Socrates challenges Theodorus' special
competence. Throughout the Theaetetus, he challenges Theodorus'
general competence, outside the field of mathematics. Theodorus,
he says, is 'hardly worth paying attention to' as a judge of physical
resemblance; is he as bad a judge of character? That must be
investigated. Speaking fearlessly, he heaped incomparable praise on
Theaetetus for intelligence, gentleness and bravery. Was he only
joking? 'That is not Theodorus' way' (l45c2), says Socrates soberly.
How, then, are we to understand-how does Theodorus understand-
the results of Socrates' examination of Theaetetus? That examination
showed that Theaetetus, who embraced the view of Theodorus' friend
Protagoras, had nothing wise in him about knowledge. By revealing
that, Socrates claims to have made Theaetetus 'less hard', 'tamer',
and more 'moderate'. What had Theaetetus become in Theodorus'
hands?
Theodorus similarly challenges Socrates' competence in the field
of philosophy. He thinks of Socrates as a sort of 'sack of speeches'
(AOYffiV 8UA.alCOV, 161a7), or worse, as an aficionado of 'empty
speeches' ('l'iMn ).,6"(01, 165a2). Socrates runs down Protagoras too
hard, ostensibly because Socrates is of the same stamp. In his most
severe criticism Theodorus compares Socrates to the villains Sciron
and Antaeus.ls
'It is no easy matter to escape questioning in your company,
Socrates', says Theodorus. 'I was deluded when I said you would
leave me in peace and not force me into the ring like the Spartans;
you seem to be as unrelenting as Sciron. The Spartans tell you to
go away if you will not wrestle, but Antaeus is more in your line;
you will let no one who comes near you go until you have stripped
him by force for a trial of strength' (l69a-b).16
Socrates only incites Theodorus further: 'Your comparisons exactly
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fit what is wrong with me, Theodorus, but my capacity for endurance
is even greater. I have encountered many heroes in debate and times
without number a Hercules or a Theseus has broken my head, but I
have so deep a passion for exercise of this sort that I stick to it all the
same' (l69b-c).
Perhaps it would take a god to break Socrates' endurance. Perhaps
it would only take a philosopher. On the one occasion when Socrates
was defeated in argument, it was a philosopher from Elea who defeated
him (viz. Parrnenides). Theodorus knows this, having noted that when
Socrates set about to refute the whole Presocratic tradition he carefully
set the Eleatics to one side. 'A feeling of respect,' he said, 'keeps me
from treating in an unworthy spirit Melissus and the others who say
the universe is one and at rest; but there is one being whom I respect
above all: Parrnenides himself is in my eyes, as Homer says, "a
reverend and awful figure".'l? Theodorus himself is willing to praise
philosophers when they are described in a way that excludes Socrates
from their kind: Theodorus' philosopher (ov ~~ qnAOOo<p<><o lCaAEt<;,
175el-2) is the stereotypical abstract thinker who cannot find his way
to the agora, who does not know whether his next door neighbour is a
human being, and who is not even aware that he knows nothing of
this. He is a mathematician who 'measures the plains' ('ta E1ti1tE~a
YEffiIlE'tpoucra, 173e6).
This is enough to show the antagonism between Theodorus and
Socrates. We note, then, that the Theaetetus ends, not in mere
agreement to meet the next day, but with Socrates abruptly turning to
Theodorus with an imperative: 'But at Dawn, Theodorus, let us meet
here again' (210<13-4). So, here comes Theodorus the next day,
lCOOlllro<;, 'obediently'; he is not necessarily promising to be well-
behaved. In fact, he is bringing some Stranger with him, an Eleatic, a
friend of the circle of Parmenides and Zeno, and a philosopher.
Ambiguity cloaks this stranger from the start: What is he, primarily?
An Eleatic? A philosopher? A friend of Parmenides, or perhaps a
friend of Zeno?
The mention ofZeno is provocative. Zeno was not named at all in the
Theaetetus, yet Plato thinks it important to have Theodorus name him
here. For Plato, it should be pointed out, the duo of 'Parmenides and
Zeno' is not altogether harmonious. In the Phaedrus, Zeno is called
the 'Eleatic Palamedes' a description more appropriate to a sophist
than to a philosopher.1 8 The portrait of Zeno in the Parmenides is
no more flattering: in the fashion of a sophist Zeno simply reads
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his treatise out at Pythodorus' house. Parmenides is perhaps more of
a philosopher since he does not attend the display, but arrives, like
Socrates in the Gorgias, 'late for the feast'. When Zeno is finished
Socrates criticises him for ingratiating himself to Parmenides by
saying the same things in a disguised way. Zeno admits that Socrates'
description was not far off, but his defence is that he wrote the book
'in a spirit of controversy' when he was young. So it appears Socrates
has misjudged him. 'You imagine: says Zeno, 'it [sc. the book] was
inspired, not by a youthful eagerness for controversy, but by the more
dispassionate aims of an older man.'19 Zeno is now older and more
dispassionate, but he has not bothered to revise his treatise.
Is the stranger more like Parmenides or Zeno? Socrates' ears seem
to have pricked up at the mention of Zeno. Whatever the stranger is,
might his aim not be the same as Zeno's: namely refutation? 'That is
not the Stranger's way' , says Theodorus, echoing Socrates' remark of
the previous day. (Theodorus will not jest, but he will mock.) The
stranger is not like the young Zeno: 'he is more measured
(J.lEtpUmEpo<;) than those with a zeal for controversy' (216b8). But he
is like the older Zeno, whose aim is still to refute, only more
dispassionately. Yesterday, Socrates had spoken of his lust for
argument. But he will not get to wrestle with the stranger; he will not
be refuted passionately. The stranger will, however, in the process of
defining the sophist, identify Socrates as one of them by a definite
description:
They [i.e. the Sophists] question thoroughly about whatever anyone
believes he's saying while saying nothing. And then, because those
questioned wander, they examine their opinions with ease, and once
they bring the opinions together into the same place by their speeches,
they put them side by side one another, and in so putting them they
show that the opinions are simultaneously contrary to themselves about
the same things in regard to the same things in the same respects. ...
The reason is, my dear boy, that those who purify them hold the view,
just as physicians of bodies ... so it's just the same that they thought
about the soul, that it will not have the benefit of the learnings to be
applied before one puts, by way of refutation, the one examined into a
state of shame, takes out the opinions that are impediments to the
learnings, and shows him forth pure and believing he knows just the
things he does know and no more. (230b-d)
Socrates is not alone. The Stranger will also find it necessary to
refute Parmenides: 'It will be necessary for us: he says, 'in defending
ourselves, to put the speech of our father Parmenides to the torture
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and force it to say "that which is not" is in some respect' (24Id).20
The dispassionate refutation of the mature Zeno takes the form of
monologue, it amounts to reading his book. The Stranger would
prefer to speak in a monologue-he has a rehearsed speech, committed
to memory (217b7-8)-but Socrates deftly suggests that he may wish
to proceed instead after the fashion of Parmenides, by means of
questions put to an interlocutor. The Stranger acquiesces out of a
sense of shame (217d8), but he sets rigid conditions: the respondent
must be obedient (e\nlVtro<;, 2l7dl). The Stranger's first two responses
to Theaetetus show that he means to enforce the rules: he tells
Theaetetus not to say any more at present, since the speech is directed
at him; and he urges Theaetetus to keep his thoughts to himself
(218a, b).
Theodorus had said that the stranger was 'more measured'. Perhaps
he means 'more mathematical'. TIlis would explain why Theodorus
thinks of him as 'very much a philosoprer' (~(j>tAOOOCPOV,216a4).
To the extent that the stranger is more measured he resembles Zeno
more than Parmenides.
Thus, by the end of the dialogue's first pages we are wondering
what sort of person the Eleatic Stranger is. Socrates' first speech
complicates the matter. It has the force of suggesting that the Stranger
is not what he appears to be. Theodorus does not notice much, he
claims, for he has not brought any stranger with him but some God,
at least if Homer is to be trusted. Socrates has two passages in the
Odyssey in mind.
The first occurs at Odyssey IX, when Odysseus reaches the island
of the Cyclopes. Odysseus tells the majority of his men 'wait here
while I with my own ship and companions that are in it go and find
out about these people, and learn what they are, whether they are
savage and violent, and without justice, or hospitable to strangers
and with minds that are godly'. I Later, when he has reason to believe
that they are not, he nevertheless addresses Polyphemous: 'Respect
the gods, 0 best of men, We are your suppliants, and Zeus the guest
god, who stands behind all strangers with honours due them, avenges
any wrong toward strangers and suppliants'.2
The second passage occurs at Odyssey XVII, where Odysseus
appears as a beggar in his own court. After he is spurned and struck
by Antinoos, one of the suitors speaks up: 'Antinoos, you did badly
to hit the unhappy vagabond: a curse on you if he turns out to be
some god from heaven, for the gods do take on all sorts of
transformations, appearing as strangers from elsewhere, and thus
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they range at large through the cities watching to see which keep the
laws and which are violent' .3
What are we to make of Socrates' references to these passages?
We should note that he is encouraging Theodorus' characterisation of
him from the previous day as a villain or a giant. For Antaeus, now
read Polyphemous; for Sciron, read Antinoos. Socrates is jockeying
for a chance to test and be tested. If the stranger is a god, that can
only be a boon to Socrates, for as he had said the previous day, 'no
god is ill-disposed towards man' (Theaetetus 151dl); Should the
stranger refute him, we could suppose he would 'consider that a
greater good, inasmuch as it is a greater good for oneself to be
relieved from the worst of evils than to relieve another' (Gorgias
458a).
But it is clear that Socrates does not think the Stranger is a god.
We know from the Republic that Socrates thinks it is impossible for a
God to alter himself; he always remains simply in his own form.
'Therefore,' he says, 'let none of the poets tell us that "the gods take
on all sorts of likenesses and frequent the cities, appearing as strangers
of all sorts" , (381-2). Moreover, there is in fact no god-stranger in
either of the passages referred to; in both of the Homeric passages the
stranger is crafty Odysseus, who has taken on a disguise of anonymity.
In fact, none of the characters in Plato's Sophist really thinks that
the stranger is a god. After the pattern of Zeus and Cronus, the
stranger is a sort of parricide (241d), but he is not a god. For the gods
'look down on the crimes and law abiding behaviour of mortals' and
the mightier of them punish those they find wanting (216b3-5). The
Stranger, even ifhe is able as philosopher to 'look down on the life of
those below', and even if he is able to discern between 'noble and
base' , is unable to prefer one to the other, and therefore he is unable
to punish:
the dialectic art never considers whether the benefit to be derived from
the purge is greater or less than that to be derived from the sponge, and
has not more interest in the one than in the other. Her endeavour is to
know what is and is not kindred in all arts with a view to the acquisition
of intelligence, and having this in view she honours them all alike. And
when she makes comparisons, she counts one of them not a whit more
ridiculous than another, nor does she esteem him who adduces as his
example of hunting, the general's art, at all more decorous than another
who cites that of the lice-eatcher, but only as the greater pretender of
the two. (227a-b)4
As practitioner of the dialectic art the stranger is true to his word. His
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first divisions seek the nature of the fisherman, who, though trivial,
'has a definition inferior to none of the greater things' (218e3). Or
again when he discovers a kind of sophistry that can distinguish
better from worse and refute the worse (that was the definition that
picked out Socrates), he must class it alongside all the ether definitions
of sophistry (23Ib). He must treat the sophists and Socrates as
belonging to the same species, though they are as wolves to the dog,
the most savage to the most tame. Should he finally seize the authentic
sophist he must hand him over to 'the royal speech' (236c), he is not
authorised to punish.
Theodorus is emphatic that the stranger is 'in no way a god'
(216b9); he is, however, divine, in virtue of being a philosopher.
What can this mean? That philosophers look like gods even though
they are not? The divinity of the stranger is a sham.
Is it possible then, that the stranger is not a philosopher either?
Socrates' next speech raises this question. At all events, the genus
of the philosopher is scarcely any easier to discern than that of a
god. For not only is it the case that, due to the ignorance of others,
philosophers sometimes have the looks of statesmen, sophists or even
madmen, it is also the case that there are sham as well as real
philosophers (216c6).
The means of telling the difference between the sham and the real
are not provided by the stranger's dialectical art. Is the fisherman that
he captures in his paradigmatic division a real fisherman or, perhaps,
an actor playing a fisherman? Does he use real flies on his line or, to
use a nicely ambiguous phrase of Norman McLean's, 'counter flies'
(Le. 'flies that in a drugstore counter look to you like the insect they
are named after')?5 Are the sophists that the stranger ensnares in his
speech real sophists, or are they philosophers who look like sophists?
And finally are the greatest kinds really the greatest kinds, or are they
imposters of the Good, the Beautiful the True and the Just? There
is an art that can distinguish between the sham and the real, but it is
not the Stranger's dialectical art; it is Socrates' art of intellectual
midwifery: 'But this is the greatest thing in my art,' he says, 'to be
capable of assaying in every way whether the thought of the young is
giving birth to an image and a lie or something fruitful and true'(l5Oc
Theaetetus).6
Faithful to his uncertainty about the YEVCX; of the Stranger, Socrates
asks him a very carefully worded question: 'What did those in that
place think and name trese thing;?' (217al). No one asks who Socrates
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means by 'those' (Gods?, Philosophers?, Eleatics?), nor does anyone
ask where he means by 'that place' (does he mean Elea, or that Place
on high from which gods and philosophers alike look down?). The
ambiguity is not settled because Theodorus diverts the issue. 'What
sort of things?' he asks.
Socrates was indirectly asking the Stranger what his r€vo~ is and
where he comes from. He will have to be content with the account the
stranger makes of himself in defining the sophist. In the Sophist the
stranger ends up by looking like a sophist. His last definition of the
sophist answers Socrates request:
The art of contradiction making, descended from an insincere [ironic]
kind of conceited mimicry, of the semblance making breed, derived
from image making, distinguished as a portion of human and not divine
production, that presents a shadow play of words, such are the 'blood
and lineage', which can, in perfect truth, be assigned to the authentic
sophist. (268c-d)7
There is not space for a thorough comparison of the Stranger and
the sophist on each of these points, but an example or two in each
case may suffice.
1. Contradiction making: The Stranger says that what characterises
the art of contradiction making is 'a sufficient ability to dispute
about everything' (232e). This is precisely what his dialectical art
enables him to do (227a-b quoted above).
2. Irony: irony may suggest Socrates in your minds more than the
Stranger. Yet Campbell argues that it shows in 'almost every
line' of the Stranger's speech. He writes: 'This was the motive for
the choice of the angler as an example, this prompts the inclusion
of war and tyranny, pleading and argument, under 9EpEU't1lCll [the
art· of hunting], and that of poetry and learning amongst the
merchant's wares, and the definition ofhiggling in the marketplace
as an inartistic kind of controversy. A deeper irony underlies the
admission of the Sophist's claim to be a purifier of the soul.,g
3. Mimicry: the sophist is a hunter, but the Stranger must hunt him
down.
4. Semblance making: this is just the making of images (whether in
speech or otherwise) that don't have the true proportions. As I
remarked earlier, on his own account of the 'really big works' the
Stranger's speech is a semblance.




6. 'Blood and lineage': this is a most important phrase. By ring
composition, a favourite device of Plato's, the end of the dialogue
returns to its beginning. There have been no quotations from
Homer since Socrates' first speech. Now the Stranger returns
Iliad for Odyssey. The passage is illuminating:
DIOMEDES (to Glaucus): Who are you, my fine friend? ... if you are an
immortal come from the blue, I'm not the man to fight the gods of
heaven.... No, my friend, I have no desire to fight the blithe immortals.
But if you're a man who eats the crops of the earth. a mortal born for
death-here, come closer ...
GLAucus: High-hearted son of Tydeus, why ask you about my birth
(yEvdlv)? Like the generations of leaves, the lives of men.... But about
my birth (YEvdlv), if you'd like to learn it well, first to last-though
many people know it-here's my story _.. (the lineage follows) ...
Such are my blood and lineage (ta{rtlle; tile; yEvdie; tE Kat a\~atOe;]
DIOMEDES: Splendid! You are my friend, my guest (~EVOe;) from the
days of our grandfathers long ago!
Iliad VI.l24-2839
It appears as though the EIeatic ;EVO~ is a sophist. If he is Plato's
mouthpiece, then Plato is a sophist. If he is not Plato's mouthpiece,
we cannot presently speak as though we know what the Sophist is
about.
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